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The authors report a series of studies designed to determine whether effects imilar to those 
observed in the innate categorical perception of color and phonemes are induced during the 
learning of simple unidimensional categories and more complex multidimensional ones. In 
Experiment 1no evidence was found for such effects when stimuli varied on 1 dimension. 
Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated a within-category compression effect but no between- 
category expansion effect for stimuli varying in 2 dimensions. Compression only was also 
shown in Experiment 4, which used pictures of actual objects. Multidimensional scaling 
analyses illustrate how within-category compression without expansion was sut~cient to 
produce categorical c ustering of items in the similarity space. These analyses also show that 
learning changed the dimensional structure of similarity space. Results are compared with 
those from other studies exploring similar phenomena and with neural network simulations. 
Most contemporary models of category learning rely to 
some degree on relative similarities between category mem- 
bers and nonmembers (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; 
Carey, 1985; Estes, 1986; Keil, 1990; Komatsu, 1992; 
Medin, 1989; Medin& Schaffer, 1978; Murphy & Medin, 
1985; Nosofsky, 1988; Pazzani, 1991; Posner & Keele, 
1968; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978). A psychological similarity 
space is generally assumed, its axes defined by values on 
relevant dimensions (e.g., size, color, shape), along which 
objects or events might vary. In principle, every object or 
event can be located in this n-dimensional space, and its 
distance from other objects can be quantified (Hutchinson &
Lockhead, 1977; Nosofsky, 1989; see also Tversky, 1988). 
In practice, it is often difficult to establish the metric of such 
spaces a priori, especially for natural objects. Nevertheless, 
some variation on exactly this procedure is used in the 
testing of most major models of categorization. Explanation- 
based theory first seemed to be an exception in this regard, 
having originally been formulated as a critique of similarity- 
based approaches to categorization (Murphy & Merlin, 
1985), but more recently it has been acknowledged that even 
an explanation-based approach is anchored in similarity 
comparisons atsome point (Goldstone, 1994b; Medin, 1989; 
Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993). 
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Despite the importance of the idea of a psychological 
similarity space in almost all approaches to categorization, 
little direct work has been done to explore the properties of 
such spaces in the context of categorization. The default 
assumption is that these spaces have a fixed dimensional 
structure and that each dimension has a fixed and generally 
linear metric. Implicit in this view is the idea that any given 
object has a determinate location in this space and that its 
proximity to other items, including prototypes or other 
summary central tendencies, can be calculated in a straight- 
forward fashion. The salience of various dimensions may 
shift as a function of category training, but the space itself is 
assumed to be an unchanging constant. 
The problem with this view is that it does not explain how 
or why the set of items that comprise a category seem to be 
so much more coherent after one has learned that they are 
members of the same category (Komatsu, 1992). A possible 
explanation of this effect would be that the space undergoes 
some form of transformation or "warping" as a result of 
category training, with members of the same category 
moving closer together than they were before the training. 
Such "chunking" effects may be an important component of 
concept formation itself. For example, if category learning 
results in a warping of the space that compresses one region 
of a dimension, thereby decreasing the psychological dis- 
tance between items in that region, this is tantamount to 
abstracting away from the stimulus values of the items on 
that dimension (within that region of the dimension). This is 
exactly the sort of effect that is required in order to 
understand how concepts manage to be abstract (i.e., treat 
distinct exemplars as equivalent, or relatively so compared 
with items lying outside the compressed region) while 
nevertheless referring to concrete particulars. There is a line 
of research that suggests that such a warping process is at 
least plausible. This framework for thinking about represen- 
tational changes induced by categorization comes from 
research on categorical perception (Harnad, 1987). 
Categorical perception is a psychophysical effect in which 
a continuous physical dimension such as intensity (of 
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mechanical or electromagnetic energy) or frequency (of 
electromagnetic radiation or of acoustic vibration) is parti- 
tioned into discontinuous orbounded regions by some kind 
of perceptual mechanism. Color categories (Bornstein, 1987) 
and phoneme categories (e.g., Pastore, 1987) have been the 
two most fully studied cases of categorical perception. 
In color perception, the gradations in the wavelength of 
light are continuous, but they are not perceived as continu- 
ous. Rather, the chromatic spectrum is segmented by the 
visual system into qualitatively distinctive categories of hue 
(Bornstein, 1987). Instead of being homogeneous (i.e., 
log-linear, like most psychophysical continua that obey 
Weber's Law), the spectral continuum is inhomogeneous, or 
warped, in the sense that it requires a larger change in 
wavelength oproduce ajust-noticeable difference (JND) in 
some regions than in others. Multiple values on the dimen- 
sion are effectively chunked together in the interior of a 
color category. In other regions of the spectrum, at the 
category boundaries, a smaller relative change in wave- 
length is sufficient to produce aJND. 
These kinds of effects also appear to occur in the 
perception of certain speech sounds. For example, voice- 
onset ime (VOT) is the interval between the plosive release 
of air that marks the beginning of certain phonemes and the 
buzzing of the larynx that gives voice to these basic sounds. 
The phonemes/d/and/t/, for example, differ in VOT when 
followed by a vowel:/ta/sounds have longer VOTs than/da/ 
sounds. This difference in voicing is perceived categorically 
as either nonvoiced (/ta/) or voiced (/da/). Artificially 
generated versions of these phonemes can provide a continu- 
ous series of sounds differing only in VOT, but people hear 
the continuous series as dividing into just two categories: 
voiced Ida/ sounds and nonvoiced /ta/ sounds (Eimas & 
Corbit, 1973). As in the color example, the effect consists of 
relative compressions of large regions of the VOT con- 
tinuum and expansions at what is perceived to be the 
category boundary. 
The mechanism responsible for the categorical perception 
of color, and for fixing the location of color boundaries, 
seems to be innate (see Bornstein, 1987). Some speech 
researchers claim that the same is true for phoneme catego- 
ries (e.g., Eimas, Siqueland, Jusczyk, & Vigorito, 1971), but 
there is also evidence for some plasticity in both the location 
(e.g., Williams, 1977) and the sharpness ( ee Pastore, 1987) 
of speech category boundaries as a function of training and 
practice. Even in the case of color categories there are data to 
indicate that experience can induce some tuning of hue 
boundaries (Raskin, Maital, & Bornstein, 1983). It thus 
appears that even in the two classical cases, category 
boundaries are not always rigidly specified. 
The fact that category boundaries remain plastic to some 
degree even in these two biologically prepared omains 
suggests hat in less constrained domains categorical percep- 
tion effects might be inducible by learning alone, without 
benefit of inborn boundaries. Given that brains can generate 
categorically perceived boundaries with dedicated neural 
structures, it is plausible that learning can reorganize less 
dedicated structures to generate similar categorical bound- 
aries de novo during category learning. To make new, 
biologically unprepared absolute judgments (Miller, 1956) 
among sets of highly interconfusable objects requires gener- 
ating, on the basis of the objects' analog sensory projections, 
a categorical (effectively digital) output indicating the 
category to which each object belongs. This is precisely 
what the categorical perception mechanism does in the 
biologically prepared case of hue and voicing. The question 
is whether learning new categories in a domain is associated 
with a similar warping of the similarity space. If it is, then 
one could speak more generally of compression effects 
whenever a dimension (or portion of a dimension) of a 
psychological similarity space is warped so as to require 
larger changes to produce a JND (compared with a pre- 
warped baseline). One could also speak generally of expan- 
sion effects whenever a dimension iswarped so as to require 
smaller changes to produce a JND (again, compared with a 
prewarped baseline). 
Our hypothesis i , accordingly, that categorical perception 
effects can be induced by learning alone, without benefit of 
an innate mechanism, More specifically, we suggest hat 
acquiring the ability to categorize objects and events is 
associated with a warping of the psychological similarity 
space such that during category learning some regions 
become compressed and others expanded, relative to their 
precategorization configuration. 
Two different lines of research, one from neural network 
simulations and the other from human experimental work, 
offer some support for the learned categorical perception 
hypothesis. First, Harnad and colleagues (Hamad, Hanson, 
& Lubin, 1991, 1995; see also Goldstone, Steyvers, & 
Larimer, 1996) used the back-propagation algorithm to train 
simple, three-layer nets to categorize inputs coded to 
correspond to lines of different lengths. The nets were first 
required to match their inputs exactly by producing as output 
a line identical in length to the input (a process called 
auto-association). Each input produces a pattern of activa- 
tion in the hidden units that can then be thought of as 
representing that input uniquely as a point in n-dimensional 
hidden-unit space. Auto-association training has the effect of 
maximizing the pairwise interstimulus distance for all of the 
inputs in this hidden-unit space. This learning is not the 
focus of interest here, however: auto-association merely gets 
the nets to a state that is comparable with that of the normal 
human who can already do reliable pairwise sensory match- 
ing before learning any categories. (You may not yet know 
which lines are short, medium, or long, but you can already 
draw a line of the same length as any line presented toyou: 
That is auto-associative matching, and the net, unlike the 
human, must first learn to do it.) 
Once trained to auto-associate, he net is trained to sort the 
input lines into either two categories ( hort vs. long; Hamad 
et al., 1991) or three categories (short, medium, or long; 
Harnad et al., 1995), while still maintaining correct auto- 
association performance. Additional output units serve as 
the markers for category membership. Categorization train- 
ing produces trong compression--expansion effects in hid- 
den-unit space, as measured by comparing the interstimulus 
distances for auto-association alone with those for auto- 
association together with categorization. It thus appears to 
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be a natural feature of back-propagation or gradient descent 
networks to produce categorical perception-like compres- 
sion--expansion effects in the course of category learning. 
Data from neural network simulations support the plausi- 
bility of learned categorical perception, and the ability to 
examine the inner workings of the nets to understand how 
the effect is produced has considerable heuristic value, but 
evidence from a second line of research--research with 
human category learners--is even more directly relevant to 
the hypothesis that category learning is based on compres- 
sion and expansion effects in similarity space. For example, 
Beale and Keil (1995, 1996) have found strong categorical 
perception effects along a continuum of faces produced by 
morphing John Kennedy's face into Bill Clinton's. These 
effects are the result of learning because they are reduced 
when the morphed faces are less familiar and absent when 
they are completely unfamiliar (see also Calder, Young, 
Perrett, Etcoff, & Rowland, 1996, and Etcoff & Magee, 
1992, for analogous morphing boundaries for facial expres- 
sion). A shortcoming that the morphing data share with the 
color and phoneme data is that, unlike the case of the 
network simulations, there is no precategorical baseline 
condition for comparison with the groups howing categori- 
cal perception effects. All that can be said is that instead of a 
log-linear Weberian continuum, one observes regions that, 
relative to each other, display compression and expansion; it 
is not known how those regions looked precategorically. But 
if categorical perception can be induced by learning in 
human as it can in neural nets, then with appropriate baseline 
control groups it should be possible to test whether learning- 
induced warping is associated with compression, expansion, 
or both. 
Learning-induced changes in the dimensional structure of 
psychological similarity space cannot be observed irectly 
in humans as they can in neural nets; they can only be 
inferred. If category learners judge items in the same 
category as more similar than do control participants, we 
will interpret this as compression; if category learners judge 
items in different categories tobe less similar than do control 
participants, this will be interpreted as expansion. Figure 1 
illustrates the three possible forms of warping (compression 
only, expansion only, and both) using hypothetical plots of a 
similarity metric for pairs of items. Note that in these graphs 
higher numbers on the y-axis indicate lower similarity 
(greater dissimilarity). For each plot, three types of pairs are 
depicted: (a) those in which both members of the pair are 
from Category A, (b) those in which each member of the pair 
is from a different category, and (c) those in which both are 
from Category B. As the figure shows, compression alone, 
expansion alone, and both together have distinctive profiles. 
Figures 2a-2c show one way in which compression and 
expansion could be dissociated ina two-dimensional similar- 
ity space. 
Using same-different judgments as the measure of similar- 
ity, Goldstone (1994a) did compare pre- and postlearning 
groups and reported finding "acquired distinctiveness" 
(what we are calling expansion effects) at learned category 
boundaries ( ee also Lawrence's, 1950, "acquired istinctive- 
ness of cues"). In Goldstone's first experiment, the stimuli 
were squares varying in size and brightness, and in a later 
experiment he found similar effects using squares varying in 
saturation and brightness. He found no evidence of compres- 
sion within category-relevant dimensions, though it did 
sometimes occur on dimensions not relevant to categoriza- 
tion. More recently, Kurtz (1996) compared the similarity 
judgments of a no-training control group with those of a 
group trained to classify simple drawings and found evi- 
dence for compression but not expansion. Stevenage (1998) 
compared people's imilarity judgments of photographs of
identical twins before and after learning to distinguish them 
and found evidence for both compression and expansion. 
Similar effects can also be found in the social categoriza- 
tion literature, particularly the work based on what Tajfel 
(1957, 1959, 1978) dubbed "accentuation theory." Accord- 
ing to this theory, when people are categorized into groups, 
between-group differences are accentuated (what we are 
calling an expansion effect, to emphasize the change in the 
similarity space), whereas within-group differences are 
minimized (what we are calling compression). The theory 
has been extended to a wide range of social judgment 
phenomena in recent years (see Eiser, 1996; McGarty & 
Penny, 1988), where it is generally assumed, without direct 
test, that compression-expansion effects are operative. Ac- 
centuation theorists believe that these effects reflect more 
general cognitive processes, largely on the basis of findings 
by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) on a line-length estimation task. 
People in their experimental group were asked to view the 
lines labeled as either As or Bs to distinguish the short and 
long categories. In two control groups, people viewed the 
same lines either without labels or with labels assigned to 
them randomly (no relationship to line length). Tajfel and 
Wilkes found evidence for what they called contrast effects 
(expansion effects) at the boundary between short and long 
lines among people in the experimental group. 
In summary, several lines of research bear on the proposal 
that categorization is associated with a warping of the 
psychological similarity space into which category instances 
are mapped. Neural network simulations show compression 
and expansion effects as a function of training and allow the 
direct examination, for heuristic purposes, of how item 
representations change during training. Related effects have 
been found in studies using human category learners, 
although the pattern of such effects is in some ways difficult 
to interpret. In many cases it is not possible to tell, relative to 
a baseline, whether the warping effects are the result of 
compression, expansion, or both, because preleaming con- 
trol groups are not available. In the few cases where control 
groups are used, the effects are inconsistent. Sometimes 
there are compression effects alone, sometimes expansion 
alone, and sometimes both. Furthermore, some doubt is cast 
on at least one of these findings (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963) by 
Richardson (1991), who failed to find either compression or
expansion among people trained to categorize lines as long 
or short. Indeed, he found that people had great difficulty 
learning to make the long-short distinction. The scope and 
character of learned categorical perception effects thus 
remains unclear in many important respects, and until there 
is greater clarity about these matters, it is not possible to 
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Figure 1. Hypothetical p ots of the learned categorical perception effect. In all cases the similarity 
ratings of control (nonlearning) participants are compared with those of people who learn a category 
distinction. The three possible patterns are (a) expansion at the category boundary without 
compression f items within the category, Co) both expansion and compression, and (c) compression 
within categories without expansion at the boundary. 
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perception (color, phonemes) occurs for stimuli varying in 
one dimension. In addition, the learned version of the effect 
for line length, the foundation for accentuation theory in 
social psychology, is controversial, given Richardson's 
(1991) recent failure to find evidence for it. Finally, given 
the finding of learned categorical perception effects using 
stimuli of higher dimensionality (e.g., Goldstone, 1994a), it 
is important to know whether these effects are inherently 
multidimensional, or whether they might be understood as 
the result of the combination of many one-dimensional 
effects. Following a report on the one-dimensional case, we 
report results from experiments using stimuli of higher 
dimensionality, including one study using very complex 
real-world categories that allow multidimensional scaling 
(MDS) analyses as a way of analyzing directly the effects of 
category learning on dimensional structure. These studies 
extend the phenomenon to more ecologically valid catego- 
ries and situations, and do so using control groups of people 
who have not learned the categories. Such controls are 
generally missing from the few studies that have been done 
in this area (see Goldstone, 1994a, and Kurtz, 1996, for 
exceptions). 
(c) 
m n 
• • 
P 
Figure 2. In (a), item n is equidistant from items m and p. In (b), 
the compression of one dimension moves items n and p closer 
together (increased similarity) without Increasing their distance 
from m. In (c), on the other hand, the result of learning is to expand 
one dimension, resulting in a greater dissimilarity between p on the 
one hand and m and n on the other, the latter two items maintaining 
their preleaming distance from one another. 
explore the potential of this approach for understanding the 
relationship between similarity and categorization. 
We begin the report of our investigations with a focus on 
whether these effects can be demonstrated reliably for 
stimuli varying in only one dimension. The one-dimensional 
case is particularly important because classical categorical 
Experiment 1
In an effort to explore the expansion phenomenon ob- 
served by Tajfel for the one-dimensional case, and mindful 
that Richardson's (1991) work on line length was already 
ongoing, we worked with a number of other stimulus 
dimensions in our laboratory, including circle diameter, 
texture density, gray-scale saturation, and the size of notches 
cut from a square figure. Several efforts to calibrate the 
magnitude of the differences along these dimensions re- 
vealed that every difference we constructed resulted in one 
of two learning patterns: (a) In the first pattern it proved 
impossible to learn the distinction at or near the boundary 
within the 240 to 480 (depending on the study) learning 
trials offered, making it impossible to test for learning- 
induced expansion or compression effects. (b) In the second 
pattern the distinction was trivially easy to learn, so that the 
learning curve jumped to an asymptote immediately after 
one sampling of the range of variation. In the latter case, the 
fact that no real learning was required made it impossible to 
test the hypothesis that learning could produce the effects. 
These patterns themselves eemed categorical, with no 
discernible transition from one pattern to the other, and are 
very similar to those reported by Richardson. 
In the course of these investigations, however, we came 
across another report in the literature that could be seen as 
relevant to the question of whether there is learned expan- 
sion or compression of similarity space on a single dimen- 
sion. This study was reported as Experiment 2 in Cross, 
Lane, and Sheppard (1965), and was done as part of an effort 
to test the motor theory of speech perception (Liberman, 
Cooper, Shankweiler, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967). Accord- 
ing to the motor theory, the perception of speech sounds is 
mediated by the movements that produce them. For ex- 
ample, stop consonants (/ba/, Ida/, /ga/) are perceived 
categorically because the articulations that generate them are 
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categorical. To challenge this hypothesis, Cross et al. (1965) 
trained participants o sort visual stimuli into two categories, 
using two different consonant-vowel--consonant triads as 
labels. The labels (/bAb/ and /gAg/, rendered as bub and 
gug, respectively) were used as a kind of a caricature of the 
motor theory, because of course the stimuli themselves were 
unpronounceable, being visual and not acoustic. The visual 
stimuli consisted of circles with one of four pie-like wedges 
of different sized angles cut from the center out to the 
circumference symmetrically around the 12 o'clock posi- 
tion. The two narrowest wedges were assigned to one 
category and the two widest o the other. The participant had 
to learn to say "bub" when either of the narrowest wedges 
appeared and "gug" in response to the two widest. If the two 
stimuli labeled bub and the two labeled gug were perceived 
categorically after the training, this would refute the motor 
theory of speech perception because it would show that 
discrete motor production of the stimuli themselves was not 
the cause of the categorical perception; rather, the learning 
of discrete responses was. (Lane, 1965, explicitly related 
this to Lawrence's, 1950, behaviorist analysis of the ac- 
quired distinctiveness and similarity of cues, which was later 
elaborated in Gibson's, 1969, work on perceptual learning.) 
Cross et al. (1965) trained 4 participants to a criterion of 
50 correct successive categorizations of the four stimuli. 
Following training, all 4 participants were able to classify 
them with near perfect accuracy, so the authors were 
confident hat category learning had taken place. Partici- 
pants were then tested for their accuracy in discriminating 
them in an ABX paradigm, in which the participant sees two 
different stimuli, A and B (in this case successively) that 
might be drawn from the same or different categories (i.e., 
two different bobs, two different gugs, or a bub and a gug). 
Then, a third stimulus, X, is presented, which is identical 
either to A or B; the participant's task is to indicate which. A 
categorical perception effect occurs if experimental partici- 
pants perform better when A and B are members of different 
categories (i.e., had different names) than when they are 
members of the same category (i.e., bub-bub or gug-gug). 
Cross et al. (1965) reported finding learned categorical 
perception. Because they tested only 4 participants, no 
statistical analyses were reported, but all 4 showed the 
predicted pattern, with better discrimination accuracy when 
A and B were drawn from different sides of the category 
boundary than when they were drawn from the same side 
(the expansion effect). 
Given the difficulties we encountered in teaching people 
categorical distinctions for several different unidimensional 
stimuli, and Richardson's (1991) similar failures for line 
length, it seemed to us important to replicate this one clear 
finding of something like the unidimensional learned categori- 
cal perception effect. Several efforts to replicate using 
computer-generated versions of the Cross et al. (1965) 
stimuli were unsuccessful. Variations in interstimulus inter- 
vals (ISis), feedback for correct performance, and sizes of 
the wedges had no effect. We considered the possibility that 
having participants view the stimuli on a computer monitor 
might somehow account for the difference, so we decided to 
try to replicate their results using the same kinds of 
equipment used in the original study. The methods described 
below are identical to those reported in Cross et al. (1965), 
except as noted. 
Me~od 
Participants. Participants were 6 undergraduates who were 
paid for their participation. 
Stimuli and apparatus. Wedges of 42 °, 46 °, 50 °, and 54 ° were 
cut from 3-in. diameter black circles; these were oriented symmetri- 
cally relative to a vertical radius from the center of the circle. The 
circles were transferred to slides. Extreme care was taken by the 
slide maker to ensure that all images were precisely centered in 
their frames and that all visible blemishes were removed from the 
positive image from which the copies were made. In the only 
significant deviation from the original Cross et al. (1965) proce- 
dure, we made multiple copies of each wedge/angle rather than 
presenting the same four slides repeatedly in random sequence. 
Twenty copies of each wedge/angle were made for the training 
session and an additional 27 for the triads in the ABX procedure. 
The images were back-projected onto a screen 24 in. from the plane 
of the participant's eyes. The projected circle was 10 in. in diameter 
with the center adjusted to a height of 5 in. above ye height. 
Slides were projected by a Model 8-2 Kodak carousel slide 
projector controlled by a cassette-driven lectronic ontrol system 
(Audiotronies Model No. 162 S-2, Audiotronics Corp., North 
Hollywood, California) interfaced to the projector. 
Procedure. After being positioned in front of the screen, the 
participant was told that various hapes, differing only in the size of 
the wedge cut out of them, would appear on the screen. The 
participant's task was to identify each shape as it appeared by 
saying aloud either/b/kb/or/gAg/. When the participant correctly 
identified the shape, the sound of a nickel dropping into a glass jar 
could be heard (Cross et al., 1965, had used a penny dispenser, but 
clearly some correction for inflation was in order). The sound of the 
nickel dropping was a digital recording enerated by a Macintosh 
Ilci computer rather than being produced by actually dropping a 
coin into a jar. However, the participant was paid according to the 
agreement. The more reliably the stimuli were classified, the more 
money the learner could earn. 
The two smaller wedges were classified as/bAb/, and the two 
larger wedges were classified as/gAg/. Stimulus presentation was 
one third of a second (Cross et al., 1965, used 300 ms) with a 
stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) of 5 s. The four stimuli were 
presented inrandom order until the participant gave 50 consecutive 
correct responses, or until 160 training trials were complete. (Cross 
et al.'s participants all learned the distinction to criterion within 120 
trials.) 
Following training, the participant was tested 96 times using all 
permutations of the four stimuli appearing in random order. The 
participant's task was to identify each stimulus as either a/b/kb/or 
a/gAg/, but no feedback was given. Stimulus presentation time and 
SOA were the same as in the training phase. 
Following identification testing, the participant performed a
series of standard ABX discrimination trials. The second stimulus 
always differed from the first, and the third or "X" stimulus was 
identical to either the first or the second. When the third stimulus 
was presented, the participant said "first" if it matched the first one, 
or "second" if it matched the second one. All pairs differed by only 
one step (i.e., the 42 ° wedge followed by the 46 ° wedge, or the 54* 
wedge followed by the 50 ° wedge), and each adjacent pair was 
presented a total of 36 times, 9 times in each of the four possible 
triad sequences (ABA, ABB, BAA, and BAB). Stimulus duration 
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and SOA were as in the previous two sessions. The interval 
between triads was 15 s. 
Results 
Not one of our 6 participants met the criterion of 50 
consecutive correct responses during the 160 trial training 
period. Although the proportion of correct responses to the 
two extreme wedges (42* and 54*) reached 98.6% during the 
identification test phase of the study, the proportion was 
considerably ower for the two wedges that straddled the 
category boundary. Performance did reach 79.8% correct for 
these two items during the identification test phase, but the 
error rate remained high and no participant even approached 
the criterion of 50 correct consecutive r sponses met by all 4 
of Cross et al.'s (1965) participants. Furthermore, all of 
Cross et al.'s participants showed the distinctive pattern of 
enhanced accuracy on the ABX trials across the category 
boundary as compared to within category trials. None of our 
participants showed this pattern. 
Discussion 
What might explain this failure to replicate a prior 
demonstration f the compression--expansion effect for a 
unidimensional stimulus et? We believe that the explana- 
tion probably lies in the one significant divergence between 
our procedure and that of Cross et al. (1965). They used a 
progrmmnable slide projector to show the same four slides 
repeatedly ina random sequence. We also presented the four 
stimuli n a random sequence, but instead of repeating the 
same four slides we presented a total of 80 different slides, 
20 for each of the four stimuli. Even though we and the slide 
maker were obsessively careful about keeping our slides free 
of idiosyncratic dust specks and scratches, uch damage is 
almost impossible to avoid entirely. Our suspicion is that he 
four slides used by Cross et al. contained unique identifying 
features in the form of such blemishes, with the result hat it 
was possible to learn to tell the slides apart by paying 
attention to these unintended markers. This could certainly 
explain their excellent identification data. Because the 
hypothesis with which we began is that the categorical 
perception effect can be produced as a result of learning, 
procedures or stimuli that result in no learning should not be 
able to produce the effect. Hence, the fact that we were 
unable to produce the effect in a situation in which the 
categories could not be learned to a high standard oes not 
fail to support the hypothesis, it simply fails to test it. 
This negative finding, together with the lack of evidence 
of learning-produced categorical perception in the one- 
dimensional stimulus domains tested by Richardson (1991) 
and in our laboratory, suggests that unidimensional learned 
categorical perception isat best difficult o demonstrate. The 
major problem has turned out to be the difficulty of 
generating a set of stimuli that is hard enough to categorize 
to require extended training yet not so hard as to be 
impossible to learn. As is always true of negative findings, 
this does not show that it is impossible to produce one- 
dimensional learned categorical perception, but the range of 
negative findings uggests that if it is possible, it is a fragile 
phenomenon, unlikely to be robust enough to explain 
category learning in general. 
One possible explanation for difficulty in producing 
one-dimensional learned categorical perception is the follow- 
hag. Suppose that he effect actually does alter the way things 
appear. Then there is reason to expect early perceptual 
processes to be relatively immune to modification by 
categorization training, at least in adults. As noted earlier, 
there is some plasticity in the location of phoneme and color 
category boundaries, each of which varies along a single 
dimension. Boundary movement is difficult to generate, 
however, requiring prolonged practice (Pastore, 1987), and 
it appears to take the form of short-term adaptation effects 
(Wilson, 1987) rather than a long-term change. The only 
long-term learned categorical perception effects, those in 
young infants, take the form of a weakening or loss of inborn 
category boundaries, for example, the loss of the rll bound- 
ary in speakers of Japanese rather than the de novo creation 
of a categorical perception boundary (Kuhl, 1987, p. 358; 
but see Logan, Lively, & Pisoni, 1991, for evidence of some 
recoverability with intensive training). The relative rigidity 
of isolated sensory dimensions i  likely to be due to the 
perceiving organisms' need for a stable link between the 
world and the elemental dimensions of (at least) early 
perceptual processing. It would be easier to maintain 
stability if early perceptual processes were relatively resis- 
tant o categorical reorganization, and the modularity (Fodor, 
1983) or cognitive impenetrability (Pylyshyn, 1984) of early 
perception has been stressed by other theorists. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from the work of Goldstone 
(1994a) and that of Beale and Keil (1995, 1996) discussed 
above that people do show learned categorical perception 
effects when learning to categorize multidimensional stimuli. 
This would make sense if categorization is the result of a 
higher order attentionai process that selects from among the 
many dimensions available in a multidimensional perceptual 
array. In this case, expansion effects might occur in category 
learners, relative to noncategorizing controls, when category- 
relevant dimensions are discovered and previously unat- 
tended distinctions at the boundary are made salient (see 
Figure 2 for an abstract example of how this might work). 
Alternatively, perceived ifferences among stimuli within a 
category might be ignored as irrelevant o a category 
distinction in the service of enhancing relative xpansion at 
the category boundary, resulting in within-category compres- 
sion. Either effect alone, or both together, might occur even 
when the dimensions along which stimuli vary are of the 
same kinds that fail to generate the compression-expansion 
effect when varied singly. The remaining experiments hus 
used multidimensional stimuli. 
Experiment 2 
Before we can begin to develop good hypotheses about 
their role in categorization, learned categorical perception 
effects need to be demonstrated and analyzed in a wider 
range of stimuli than those explored thus far. In addition, 
there are too few studies of the phenomenon that include 
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proper baseline control conditions. Such controls are neces- 
sary to determine whether compression, expansion, or both 
has occurred for the learning roup. In the following study, 
we explored multidimensional learned categorical percep- 
tion effects using schematic stimuli that resemble single- 
celled organisms. These are more like actual categories in 
the world than squares of varying brightness or saturation, 
but because they are constructed, imensions of variation 
can be carefully controlled. To determine whether compres- 
sion or expansion effects occurred, we relied on similarity 
judgments as the dependent measure. Pilot work showed 
that, compared with measures of discriminability, similarity 
judgments are more sensitive indices of learning-induced 
changes. Particularly with complex, multidimensional stimuli, 
two objects that could still be discriminated following 
category learning might nonetheless have become more 
psychologically similar, just as two objects that were 
discriminable before category learning might become more 
dissimilar. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 16 Vassar College undergradu- 
ates and staff who either volunteered their participation aspart of 
an introductory psychology course requirement or were paid for 
their time. 
Stimuli. Stimuli were designed to resemble microorganisms 
(see Figure 3) and varied on two dimensions, including the length 
of a set of hairlike projections, or cilia, and the shape of a headlike 
portion of the figure. Head shape was varied as follows. A simple 
irregular polygon, open on one side, was constructed with four 
vertices or inflection points. These inflection points were moved 
incrementally prior to smoothing so as to produce variations in the 
depth of the lower (Gex) and upper (Zof) indentations observable 
in the right-hand portion of the sample stimuli shown in Figure 3. 
The pictured indentations represent extremes on this dimension; 
intermediate values gradually shift the indentation from upper to 
lower. Extensive pretesting of the psychophysical scaling proper- 
ties of these features (see Livingston & Andrews, 1995, for details) 
ensured that differences between adjacent values on each of the 
dimensions were equally discriminable and well above the JND 
threshold. All stimulus presentations and data recording were 
automated by means of a SuperCard program running on a 
Macintosh Ilcx or Ilci computer. 
Eight discrete values of each dimension were chosen for the 
design of the stimuli used in this study. Two categories were created 
and identified by the nonsense labels Gex and Zof, names chosen 
for their low associative strength. Gexes had the four shorter cilia 
values, and the Gex head shape tended toward an indentation of
varying depth in the lower half of the figure. Zofs had the four 
longer cilia and a head shape that tended toward an indentation in 
the upper half of the figure. The two categories were, thus, perfectly 
separable with no overlapping values on either dimension, and the 
intervals between values on both dimensions were equally discrim- 
inable between all pairs, whether they fell within a category or 
across the arbitrarily chosen category boundary. All other features 
of the stimuli were nonvarying inthis study. 
Procedure. Participants were assigned randomly to either a 
learning or a baseline (control) condition. The procedure for the 
learning participants was as follows. The participant was seated 
with eyes 70 cm from the screen, the distance at which psychophysi- 
cal scaling of the stimuli was done. Stimuli were presented in 
blocks of 32, 16 from each of the two categories. Order of 
Figure 3. Examples of stimuli from the Gex and Zof categories 
from Experiments 2 and 3. 
presentation within each block was determined randomly except 
that no more than four members of the same category could appear 
in sequence. Each stimulus appeared on screen for 2 s, and the 
participant indicated whether it was a Gex or a Zof by a keypress. 
Following the keypress, the participant heard either "Right, that 
was a (Gex/Zof)," or "Wrong, that was a (Gex/Zof)." These 
phrases were digitally recorded and played back simultaneously 
with the change in level of a bar chart at the bottom of the screen. 
The bar chart went up by one level for each correct response and 
went down by five levels for each error. The next stimulus in the 
series was presented 2 s after the feedback was delivered. All 
participants received 96 training trials, regardless of level of 
performance. Thereafter, the participant was judged to have 
reached criterion and training was stopped when all 32 stimuli in a 
block were identified correctly, or after 256 trials (eight trial 
blocks), whichever came first. 
The similarity judgment task was the same for both learning 
participants and baseline or control-group participants; for the 
latter, this was the only task. The participant judged a total of 90 
pairs of stimuli, including 30 Gex-Gex pairs, 30 Zof-Zof pairs, and 
30 Gex-Zof pairs. 1 Using a city-block metric to define distances 
between items varying on two dimensions, we selected the 
within-category pairs randomly, with the constraint that he number 
1 Some pairs were presented for evaluation more than once in 
order to address issues not under discussion i  this article. In those 
cases, only the first response to the pair was included in the 
computation f mean similarity ratings. 
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of pairs at each degree of separation be roughly equivalent. 
Between-category pairs were restricted to the same degrees of 
difference as the within category pairs so as not to artificially inflate 
the between-category differences, given that pairs selected across 
the category boundary could differ to a much greater degree than 
those selected from within. This had the effect of overrepresenting 
items nearer to the boundary in the between-category set, as 
compared with a truly random selection from all between-category 
pairs, but with the result that the degree of physical difference 
between pairs was equivalent for between- and within-category 
pairs. Order of presentation of the pairs for judging was random. 
The first member of the pair was presented for 2 s, followed by a 
blank screen for 1 s, and then the second member of the pair for 2 s. 
Similarity was rated on a 9-point scale from 1 (most similar) to 9 
(least similar), using the computer keyboard to enter esponses. A 
bar with the numbers I to 9 appeared on the screen representing the 
similarity scale and remained on until the participant made a 
response (the words most similar anchored the low end of the scale, 
and the words least similar anchored the high end of the scale). 
Results  
All but one of the participants in the learning condition 
met criterion; the participant who failed to do so missed a 
single item in each of the last two blocks of 32 trials. This 
was judged to constitute sufficient evidence of having 
learned the category distinction, so the participant's data 
were included in the similarity analysis. Mean number of 
items correct out of the first 16 items for all learning 
participants was 9.62, which is not significantly different 
from chance. The distinction between categories was there- 
fore nontrivial and did require learning. The learning curve 
presented in Figure 4 is averaged across all participants. 
Note that this curve is representative of the learning curves 
for individual participants, which was gradual in every 
instance; it does not mask individual all-or-none learning 
effects. 
A graph of mean similarity ratings by group (baseline vs. 
learning) is shown in Figure 5 (recall that higher numbers 
reflect lower similarity ratings). A 2 (group: baseline vs. 
learning) × 3 (pair type: Gex-Gex, Gex-Zof,  Zof-Zof)  
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on 
the second variable revealed a marginal effect of condition, 
F(1, 14) = 4.217, MSE = 2.183,p < .06; a significant effect 
of pair type, F(2, 28) = 3.384, MSE = 0.652, p < .05; and a 
significant interaction effect, F(2, 28) = 7.889, MSE = 
0.652, p < .002. 
The compression-expansion model suggests, a priori, the 
need for tests of differences between three pairs of those 
means involved in the interaction effect. The critical compari- 
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Experiment 2. Post hoc analyses revealed compression effects without expansion at the category 
boundary. 
sons are those that establish whether learning has an effect 
on judged similarity of stimulus pairs. We therefore per- 
formed t tests of the differences between the control and 
learning roups for three pair types: the two within-category 
comparisons (Gex-Gex \[G-G\], Zof-Zof \[Z-Z\]), and the 
between-category comparison (Gex-Zof \[G-Z\] ). 
Planned t tests on the differences between these means are 
presented in Table 1. The criterion for significance was 
Bonferroni adjusted to correct for multiple comparisons. 
Comparisons between the two groups of participants showed 
that the mean similarity rating for the G-G pairs in the 
learning condition differed from the corresponding mean 
rating in the baseline condition. The Z--Z ratings also 
reflected significantly reduced similarity ratings among 
participants in the learning group as compared with the 
baseline group. In contrast, the mean similarity ratings for 
the G-Z pairs did not differ for the two groups. Note that a 
post hoc contrast of within-category versus between- 
Table 1 
Planned t Tests of Learning Versus Baseline Means 
for Gex-Zof Nonoverlap Study 
Type of pair tested Difference t(14) p 
Gex--Gex - 1.265 - 3.134 .0040* 
Zof-Zof - 1.764 -4.370 .0002*** 
Gex-Zof 0.401 0.994 .3287 
*Significant at Bonferroui adjusted equivalent ofp < .05. ***Sig- 
nificant at Bonferroni adjusted equivalent ofp < .001. 
category pairs for the baseline group showed no effect of 
pair type (F < 1). 
Discussion 
The significant interaction of Group × Pair Type, com- 
bined with the finding of no significant difference in mean 
similarity ratings for different pair types in the control 
groups, is consistent with a warping of the psychological 
similarity space as a result of category learning. Planned t
tests revealed that the effect was limited to a compression of
similarity space within categories without increased expan- 
sion at the boundary between categories. This is in contrast 
to a Gibsonian theory of perceptual learning (Gibson, 1969), 
which predicts that one should see an increase in distinctive- 
ness as a result of category learning. However, acquired 
distinctiveness and acquired similarity are obviously oppo- 
site sides of the same coin when one views the psychological 
similarity space nonlocally. If the members of a category 
acquire increased similarity (the compression effect), even if 
they are not in the process eparated from nearby members 
of other categories, the resulting compression makes the 
categories more distinctive qua categories. When Gexes (for 
example) can be treated pretty much alike, and so can Zofs, 
then it is easier to distinguish Gexes as a category from Zofs. 
Finding compression without expansion isalso interesting 
because it is not consistent with the interpretation f these 
data as the result of a simple demand effect. The worry here 
is that category learners are merely trying to respond to the 
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experimenter's expectation that items that have been given 
the same label ought to be judged as more similar, whereas 
those with different labels should be judged as more 
dissimilar. The fact that the similarity of within-category 
pairs was greater for category learners than for nonlearners, 
whereas the between-category pairs were not judged to be 
less similar, casts some doubt on this interpretation. If
people were complying with this demand, then one would 
have expected changes in both directions relative to the 
nonlearner baseline. Further evidence against he view that 
similarity judgments are driven by whether the same label is 
attached to a group of objects comes from cross-linguistic 
research by Sloman, Malt, and Shi (1997). They reported 
evidence that despite the fact that English and Chinese 
speakers have different linguistic category boundaries for 
the domain "containers," their perceptual similarity judg- 
ments of those objects are the same. They concluded that 
having labels for categories of objects does not in and of 
itself account for the shape of psychological similarity 
space, although it should be noted that the labels were not 
highlighted in the lab prior to giving similarity judgments. 
Nevertheless, given the absence of an effect of labeling per 
se, and the selective shift in the similarity space in our own 
data (compression but not expansion), we conclude that it is 
unlikely that demand effects account for the learned categori- 
cal perception effects we observed. 
It is possible, however, that the compression without 
expansion in this study arose from the way we arranged the 
categories and category boundary. In the following experi- 
ment, we explored the effects of one possible change in this 
configuration. 
Experiment 3
One might hypothesize that a pattern of compression 
without expansion reflects the already clear separation 
between Gexes and Zofs. After all, they share no overlap- 
ping values on either dimension, and the dimensions were 
scaled so as to be well above JND levels. Under these 
conditions, learning to ignore or to minimize within- 
category differences i  sufficient o partition the similarity 
space for efficient categorization. It is a reasonable hypoth- 
esis, however, that when the values on the category-relevant 
dimensions are not as distinctive, that is, when the boundary 
is particularly "noisy," a mechanism for enhancing separa- 
tion may be more readily engaged. To explore this hypoth- 
esis, we created new versions of the Gex-Zof categories in 
which there were shared or overlapping feature values on 
both of the category-relevant dimensions. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 20 Vassar College undergradu- 
ates who participated in partial fulfillment of an introductory 
psychology course requirement. 
Stimuli. Stimuli were constructed according to the same basic 
plan used to build the stimuli for the previous tudy, except that the 
values on the two varying features could overlap. Thus, Gexes had 
the five shortest cilia (out of eight), instead of the four in the 
previous tudy, and the five head shapes tending toward indentation 
on the lower portion of the figure. Zofs had the five longest cilia and 
five heads tending toward indentation on the upper portion of the 
figure. Thus, the two middle values on both dimensions could occur 
in both Gexes and Zofs. Two of the four hilly ambiguous stimuli 
were removed from the set to simplify the categorization rule, 
resulting in a total of 22 stimuli in each category. Despite the 
overlap in feature value range, all stimuli were unambiguously 
assigned to one of the two categories. 
Procedure. Participants were again assigned randomly to ei- 
ther a baseline or a learning roup. The learning procedure was the 
same as that used.in the previous tudy, except that a block of trials 
consisted of presenting all 44 stimuli from the two categories in a 
random sequence. Training was continued for 352 trials unless the 
participant managed to respond correctly to all 44 stimuli n a trial 
block, in which case training was halted. The participant was 
allowed a break after Trials 132 and 264. The similarity judgment 
procedure was also the same as that used in the previous study. 
Again, only a subset of all possible pairs was rated, this time 
including 38 pairs of each of the comparison types (Gex-Gex, 
Gex-Zof, and Zof-Zof). The subset was selected according to 
criteria like those used in Experiment 2. 
Results 
The boundary conditions in this study made the task of 
learning the category distinction much more difficult. Only 1 
of the 10 participants in the learning condition actually 
managed a completely errorless trial block (on Block 5). All 
other participants continued training for the full 352 trials. 
The mean number correct out of the first 22 trials was 12.2, 
which is not significantly different from chance. An aver- 
aged learning curve is presented in Figure 6. With the 
exception of Participant 10, all participants gave clear 
evidence of having learned the distinction, despite the 
failure to achieve a perfect response record. Excluding 
Participant 10, the mean percentage correct for the last trial 
block was 89.4%. Participant 10 was still responding at 
chance (exactly 50%) on the last trial block, and this 
participant's data were excluded from the analyses that 
follow on the grounds that failure to acquire the category 
makes it impossible to test for predicted effects of category 
learning. 
A graph of the mean similarity ratings by both baseline 
and learning groups is shown in Figure 7. A 2 (group: 
baseline vs. learning) × 3 (pair type: G-G, G-Z, Z-Z) 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the second variable 
revealed a marginally significant effect of condition, F(1, 
17) = 3.829, MSE = 1.225, p < .10, and a significant 
interaction effect, F(2, 34) = 4.598, MSE = 0.641, p < .02. 
The same pattern of planned t tests explored in the previous 
study was also examined for these data; the results are 
shown in Table 2. The criterion for statistical significance 
was again Bonferroni adjusted. The comparisons between 
groups with respect to the same pair types revealed that the 
ratings of G-Z pairs did not differ for the two groups, 
suggesting no between-category expansion effect. The G-G 
pairs were judged to be significantly more similar by 
learning than by baseline participants, but the Z-Z differ- 
ence only approached significance. As in Experiment 2, a 
post hoc contrast of within-category versus between- 
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category pairs for the baseline group shows no effect of pair 
type, F(1, 17) = 2.231,p > .1. 
Discussion 
As in the previous tudy, the significant interaction effect 
reflects the hypothesized change in the structure of the 
similarity space following category learning, but again the 
change involved within-category compression effects only, 
despite the fact that the boundary was much less well 
defined. Although the overall effect of compression was 
significant, the effect was weaker than in the previous 
experiment, as revealed by planned tests showing that the 
compression effect reached significance for only one of the 
categories. The failure to observe between-category expan- 
sion does not appear to be attributable to nonoverlap of 
dimensional values at the boundary. Even when the category 
boundary was hard to discriminate, compression ofa subset 
of exemplars into a smaller region of the psychological 
similarity space was sufficient o establish a new, more 
tractable psychological unit (e.g., the Gex chunk), even 
while maintaining the same level of distinctiveness between 
items across the new category boundary. The effect is to 
increase relative distinctiveness by producing absolute 
compression without affecting distinctiveness across the 
boundary. 
Thus far, the category distinctions we have manipulated 
depended on psychologically equal intervals along continu- 
ous dimensions. This raises questions about whether the 
learned categorical perception effect as thus far observed is 
peculiar to artificial stimulus domains. There are obvious 
advantages tousing artificial stimuli n studies of this kind. 
First, it is difficult to study concept formation in adults 
without using artificial categories because so much of what 
is knowable about the world is already organized into 
categorical form by adults. Second, artificial categories give 
the experimenter complete control of stimulus features and 
of category structure. Despite these advantages, it is impor- 
tant to investigate whether the findings from research with 
artificial stimuli generalize to real objects, if the theory is to 
be extended as an account of category learning outside the 
laboratory. It is not sufficient to assume that a phenomenon 
observed when stimuli are relatively simple and configured 
into artificial categories will apply when the stimuli are more 
richly multidimensional and have been classified by people 
other than the experimenters. One could address these 
concerns by building more elaborate stimuli n the labora- 
tory and having study participants impose classifications, 
but in the next study we took advantage ofan unfamiliar but 
natural category distinction to address these concerns. 
Experiment 4 
There are some naturally occurring stimulus domains that 
are not familiar to adults (the Gex-Zof categories trade on 
the unfamiliarity omost adults of single-celled organisms), 
and one of these has been the subject of considerable 
speculation by cognitive scientists for some time. In fact, an 
entire mythology has grown up around the arcane process of 
learning to distinguish male from female day-old chicks by 
professional chicken sexers (e.g., Gibson, 1969; Lawrence, 
1950). Contrary to legend, the distinction can be learned, 
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Experiment 3.As in Experiment 2,post hoe analyses revealed compression effects without expansion 
at the category boundary. 
and learned relatively quickly, given information about 
which features to look for (Biederman & Shiffrar, 1987). 
In this experiment, we set out to study whether the learned 
categorical perception effect occurs when people learn to 
categorize drawings of chick cloaca. To minimize potential 
influences of any background knowledge about he morphol- 
ogy of sex differences (see Livingston & Andrews, 1995; 
Wisniewski & Medin, 1994, for findings related to the 
interaction of prior knowledge and stimulus structure), we 
told our participants that they would be learning to distin- 
guish pictures of the larynxes of two different species of 
monkey. We thus had an opportunity to study whether the 
learned categorical perception effect occurs when partici- 
pants encounter a stimulus et (a) that is more complex and 
multidimensional than those used in previous studies, and 
(b) in which the category membership of an instance is not 
an arbitrary stipulation by the experimenter but a fact of 
nature. 
Table 2 
Planned t Tests of Learning Versus Baseline Means 
for Gex-Zof Overlap Study 
Type of pair tested Difference t(17) p 
Gex--Gex - 1.252 -3.404 .0017"* 
Zof-Zof -0.763 -2.074 .0457 
Gex-Zof 0.291 0.792 .4341 
**Significant at Bonferrohi adjusted equivalent ofp < .01. 
Me~od 
Participants. Participants were 20 volunteers recruited by 
public advertisements. They ranged in age from 18 to 44 years, and 
all participants were paid for their participation. 
Stimuli. Stimuli were 14 black-and-white drawings, 2.4 cm 
wide × 1.9 cm high, of the genitalia of day-old chicks, seven of 
them male and the other seven female, taken from Biederman and 
Shiffrar (1987). Figure 8 shows a subset of these stimuli. Selection 
of the stimuli from the larger set was random, subject o the 
constraint that there be equal numbers of stimuli drawn from the 
two categories. Stimuli were cropped from high-quality copies and 
pasted onto 10 cm X 15 cm blank index cards and then placed into 
two-ring binders. One stimulus was placed in the center of each 
card for the learning trials. Six copies were made of each stimulus 
and six different random sequences of the 14 stimuli were 
generated. Separate binders were prepared for the similarity- 
judgment task, with the stimuli for a given pair placed side by side 
in the center of the same card and approximately 2.7 cm apart. All 
possible pairs of the 14 stimuli were included, and two sets were 
made, reversing the left-right position of the members of each pair 
between sets. 
Procedure. Participants were assigned to either a learning 
condition or a baseline (control) condition. Participants in the 
learning condition were told that they would be viewing pictures of 
the larynxes of two different species of monkeys and that they 
would be asked to learn to tell which was which. No prior 
information was given about the nature of the differences. Each 
participant viewed the pictures in one of two sequences (each was 
simply the reverse of the other). The participant was asked to label 
each picture as either Type A or Type B and was given immediate 
feedback by the experimenter, who recorded the response and then 
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Figure 8. Examples of the pictures of male and female chicken 
cloaca used as stimuli in Experiment 4. From "Sex Determination 
of Day-Old Chicks. II. Type Variations," by T. H. Canfield, 1941, 
Poultry Science, 20, p. 328. Copyright 1941 by The Poultry 
Science Association. Reprinted with permission. 
turned to the next picture in the sequence. Training continued until 
the participant met the criterion of two error-free trial blocks (28 
stimuli), or until a total of 252 presentations (18 trial blocks), 
whichever came first. 
Following training, the participant was asked to judge the degree 
of similarity between stimuli presented in pairs. A series ofpract ce
judgments was made to familiarize the participants with the scale. 
Judgments were then made using the same 9-point scale used in 
previous studies. Participants in the baseline condition judged the 
similarity of the same pairs without prior training. 
Resu l~ 
The mean proportion of correct responses in the first trial 
block was .529, a proportion ot significantly different from 
chance. Figure 9 shows the mean learning curve for all 
learning participants. The mean proportion of correct re- 
sponses in the last trial block was .936, so there is clear 
evidence that the learning participants mastered the distinc- 
tion. However, 4 of the 10 learning participants failed to 
reach the criterion for termination of training. The mean 
proportion of correct responses in the last block of 18 trials 
for these participants did reach .84, which is greater than 
chance and suggests that they had succeeded in learning 
something about the distinction. A 2 (criterion reached vs. 
not reached) × 3 (pair type: Type A-Type A, Type A-Type 
B, and Type B-Type B) ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the second variable confirmed that there was no difference in 
the similarity ratings of those participants who did reach 
criterion and those who did not, F(1, 18) = 1.402, MSE = 
2.784, p > .2, and no interaction with pair type, F(2, 36) < 
1, MSE = 1.068. The data from all learning participants 
were therefore ntered into the subsequent comparison of 
data from the learning and baseline conditions. 
Figure 10 shows the mean similarity ratings by the 
baseline and learning groups for the three pair types (A-A, 
A-B, and B-B). A 2 (group) × 3 (pair type) ANOVA on 
similarity judgments with repeated measures on the second 
variable revealed significant main effects of group, F(I ,  
18) = 4.551, MSE = 1.652, p < .05, and pair type, F(2, 
36) -- 10.290, MSE = 0.510, p < .001. The hypothesized 
interaction of group with pair type was marginally signifi- 
cant, F(2, 36) = 3.183, MSE = 0.510,p = .053. 
Table 3 contains the same planned t tests of the differences 
between means examined in the previous two studies, and 
the pattern is a familiar one. The learning and baseline 
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Figure 10. Plot of similarity ratings for both control (n = 10) and learning (n = 10) groups in 
Experiment 4. As in Experiments 2 and 3, post hoc analyses revealed compression effects without 
expansion at the category boundary. 
groups did not differ in their judgments of the between- 
category pairs, but the learning participants judged the 
within-category pairs to be more similar than did the 
baseline participants. 
Because we had similarity ratings from the complete set 
of possible pairs of category instances for this study, it was 
possible to use an MDS analysis to explore the changes in 
relationships among items that result from category learn- 
ing. However, we did not initially force the data from the 
baseline and learning roups into a common solution for the 
simple reason that we do not know whether the dimensional 
structure of the stimuli in psychological similarity space 
remains the same following category training. Indeed, the 
available evidence suggests that category learning can 
change the relative salience of the dimensions along which a 
set of objects differs, even to the point of drawing attention 
to previously unattended features (Livingston & Andrews, 
1995; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994). In recognition of this 
Table 3 
Planned t Tests of Learning Versus Baseline Means 
for Chicken Study 
Type of pair tested Difference t(18) p 
Male-male -0.833 -2.608 .0132" 
Female--female -1.205 -3.771 .0006** 
Male--female - 0.086 < 1 
*Significant at Bonferroni adjusted equivalent ofp < .05. **Sig- 
nificant at Bonferroni adjusted equivalent ofp < .01. 
possibility, the baseline and learning data were submitted to 
separate ALSCAL (Euclidean distance scaling) models (see 
Homa, Rhoads, & Chambliss, 1979, for similar arguments). 
For both models, a three-dimensional solution provides the 
best fit to the data, with stress = .128 and R 2 = .818 for the 
baseline model, and stress = .129, R 2 = .850 for the learning 
model. 
In an effort to identify the dimensions extracted by the 
MDS analysis, we quantified seven dimensions along which 
the stimuli varied. These seven dimensions included all of 
the single, nonmlational features that the experimenters 
were able to identify as both separable and quantifiable. The 
first two authors (Kenneth R. Livingston and Janet K. 
Andrews) made all measurements or ratings independently, 
and these were correlated to determine reliability. The shape 
of the major central structure was quantified by rating the 
degree of its concavity-convexity. This was the stimulus 
property of this structure identified by Biederman and 
Shiffrar (1987) as diagnostic of the category difference for 
their chicken sexers. A value of +10 was assigned to 
maximally convex (essentially spherical) structures, and a 
value of - 10 was assigned to maximally concave structures. 
The largest negative value assigned by either of the raters 
was -5 ,  because none of the structures was maximally 
concave. Interrater reliability of ratings for this dimension 
was r = .802. 
The second dimension rated was the number of different 
lobes comprising the central structure. These ranged from 
one to three in number, and reliability for this coding was 
LEARNED CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION 747 
Table 4 
Forward Stepwise Regression of Chicken Stimulus Values 
on the Dimensions Extracted by the ALSCAL MDS Analysis 
MDS dimension 
and stimulus variable AR 2 \[3 t(11) 
Baseline Dimension 2a 
Step 1: Beads .425 0.773 4.988*** 
Step 2: Size .322 0.581 3.747** 
Learning Dimension 1 b 
Step 1: Shape .696 1.011 6.449**** 
Step 2: Lobes .099 0.361 2.304* 
Learning Dimension 3c 
Step 1: Height .401 -0.833 -4.408** 
Step 2: Overlap .208 0.498 2.419" 
Note. 13 is the standardized regression coefficient for each 
variable in the final equation that incorporates both variables. 
ALSCAL = standard Euclidean distance scaling algorithm; 
MDS = multidimensional scaling. 
aFinal R 2 = .747, F(2, 11) = 16.258, p < .001. bFinal R 2 = .795, 
F(2, 11) = 21.276,p < .001. CFinalR2 = .609, F(2, 11) = 8.571, 
p < .01. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. ****p < .0001. 
1.00. The third dimension, apparent size of the central 
structure, was calculated by measuring the area of the 
two-dimensional projection of that portion of the image. 
Reliability was .942 for this measure. 
Below or to either side of the central structure, one finds a 
bilaterally symmetrical pair of roughly tubular folds that 
vary in how close together they are. We measured the 
minimal distance between each pair, with a reliability of 
.983. In addition, the central structures of the stimuli vary in 
their height above these protruding folds, as measured from 
the center of the main structure to the point of closest 
approach of the protuberances. This dimension was mea- 
sured with reliability of .819. The positioning of the central 
structure with respect to the protuberance r sulted in varying 
degrees of overlap of these two features. The degree of 
overlap was measured as the distance from the furthest 
outside edge of the central structure to the point of closest 
approach of the protuberance. This measure was taken on 
both sides and averaged; reliability for this measure was 
.947. Finally, we counted the number of beadlike structures 
to either side of the central structure. The reliability of this 
count was .925. 
Because reliabilities were acceptably high in all cases, we 
took the average of the values assigned by the two raters to 
each stimulus for entry into all subsequent analyses. Our 
goal in these analyses was to discover the identities of the 
dimensions extracted by the MDS analysis. To that end, we 
regressed each of the six dimensions identified by the MDS 
analysis (three baseline and three learning) onto the seven 
measures described, using a forward stepwise procedure. 2 A 
summary of these analyses i  presented inTable 4. For three 
of the analyses (Baseline Dimensions 1and 3, and Learning 
Dimension 2), none of the seven variables was significantly 
related to the MDS dimension; hence, we cannot infer the 
nature of these dimensions, although it should be noted that 
shape almost reached significance for Baseline Dimension 1 
(r = .480, p < .09). For Baseline Dimension 2, the number 
of beads and the size of the central structure together 
accounted for approximately 75% of the variance. For 
Learning Dimension 1, shape emerged as the predominant 
feature, accounting for approximately 70% of the variance, 
with number of lobes, which is also a feature of the central 
structure, accounting for an additional 10%. This result is 
consistent with Biederman and Shiffrar's (1987) account of 
shape as the most important factor for the chicken sexers in 
their study. Height and degree of overlap together accounted 
for 61% of the variance in Learning Dimension 3, suggest- 
ing that attention was paid to the relationship of the central 
structure to other structures. 
Thus, in so far as we are able to identify what the MDS 
dimensions reflect about he stimuli, they appear to be quite 
different for the baseline and learning conditions. Figure 11 
shows separate plots for the baseline (control group) and 
learning solutions. Careful inspection does show that items 
become less dispersed and move toward linear separability 
in that a clear boundary between categories is easier to 
identify in the learning as compared with the baseline plots. 
As a further check on these findings, we also performed 
an INDSCAL (individual differences or weighted Euclidean 
distance model) analysis on the data, forcing the two groups 
into the same solution space. This resulted in some loss of 
precision, as indicated by the lower R 2 (.79 vs..85 and .82 
for the learning and control ALSCAL solutions, respec- 
tively), and it also indirectly suggests that the dimensional 
structure of the space was different for the two groups, 
although not necessarily in the same way suggested by the 
ALSCAL solutions. The INDSCAL solution confirmed that 
the most important dimension of similarity-dissimilarity 
was shape (see Table 5). Furthermore, the subject weights 
(which indicate the degree to which a particular dimension is 
important in explaining the distribution of similarities for 
each group) for the two groups differed in the expected 
direction. In particular, the shape dimension had a weight of 
.5888 for the control group, but a weight of .6927 for the 
learning group. The groups did not appear to differ on 
Dimension 2 (.4333 for the control group, .4584 for the 
learning group), but the control group weighted Dimension 
3 more heavily (.4996) than the learning roup (.3344). 
One remaining question that can be answered by these 
data is whether the compression effect was equivalent for all 
within-category pairs, or whether it was instead greater for 
some pairs than others. For each within-category pair, the 
mean similarity rating for the learning roup was subtracted 
from the mean rating for the control group. The resulting 
differences were roughly trichotomized (small, medium, and 
large differences) and submitted to a one-way ANOVA, 
which was significant, F(2, 39) = 60.898, MSE = 0.132, 
2 We also explored the relationship of all possible ratios between 
pairs of variables (excluding shape) to the MDS dimensions and 
none emerged as superior to relationships with individual variables. 
For example, the ratio of number of beads to size does not better 
predict values on Baseline Dimension 2 than either variable taken 
alone. We therefore report only those analyses involving single 
variables. 
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Figure II. Multidimensional scaling (ALSCAL [standard Euclidean distance scaling]) plots for 
similarity ratings of chicken cloaca stimuli for both the control and learning roups of Experiment 4. 
The scale is identical for the two plots. The two categories are represented bythe letters A (the male 
stimuli) and B (the female s~muli). Curved lines drawn in the XF plane are intended to make 
identifying category groupings easier. 
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Table 5 
Forward Stepwise Regression of Chicken Stimulus 
Values on the Dimensions Extracted by the 
INDSCAL MDS Analysis 
MDS dimension 
and stimulus variable AR 2 13 t(ll) 
Dimens ion  1 a 
Step 1: Shape .487 0.941 4.764*** 
Step 2: Lobes .187 0.496 2.510" 
Dimension 2b 
Step 1: Overlap .365 -0.604 -2.629* 
Dimension 3c 
Step 1: Height .344 - 1.086 -4.919"** 
Step 2: Distance .345 -0.770 -3.490** 
Note. 13 is the standardized regression coefficient for each 
variable in the final equation that incorporates both variables. 
INDSCAL = individual differences or weighted Euclidean dis- 
tance sealing; MDS = multidimensional scaling. 
aFinal R 2 = .674, F(2, 11) =c11.366,~p < .01. bFinal R 2 = .365, 
F(2, 11) = 6.910,p < .05. FinalR = .689, F(2, 11) = 12.177, 
p < .01. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
p < .0001. Thus, not all pairs increase in similarity to the 
same degree following learning. 
Discussion 
The finding that category learning results in compression 
of the psychological similarity space without expansion 
confirms and extends the findings from our studies using 
artificial stimuli and categories. The use of MDS analysis 
was new to this study, and although it is not easy to compare 
the solutions for the baseline and learning conditions, the 
analysis does help to visualize the kinds of changes in 
psychological similarity space that occur with multidimen- 
sional category learning. The results of the regression 
analyses reported above show that some dimensional changes 
did in fact occur in the course of category learning, as 
expected. Because the dimensions are different for the two 
solutions, the resulting MDS plots are of heuristic value 
only, but they do show concretely how it is that increased 
local compression could occur without an increase in global 
separation between categories. The plots show how in- 
creased similarity is by its nature accompanied by increased 
distinctiveness. 
Complementary INDSCAL solutions confirm the shift in 
dimensional structure, although by forcing the two groups 
into the same dimensional space it may actually underesti- 
mate the extent of the shift. For example, the ALSCAL 
analysis makes clear that the control group appeared to give 
considerable attention to number of beads as a dimension, 
but this did not emerge as an important dimension when the 
groups were forced into the same similarity space. Addi- 
tional work will be required to develop more suitable ways 
of representing the multidimensional changes that occur 
with learning. 
Finally, the fact that there were significant differences in
the amount by which pairs increased in similarity between 
the control and learning groups is inconsistent with a 
demand-effect in erpretation f the learned categorical per- 
ception effect. 
General Discussion 
A good first test of whether an experimental psychological 
effect is a nontrivial one is whether it would surprise our 
grandmothers. By this standard, an experiment that demon- 
strated that objects in the same category resemble one 
another more than they resemble objects in other categories 
would fail the grandmother test, for Grandma would com- 
ment, "Of course they look more alike, that's why we put 
them in the same category in the first place!" Grandma 
would be much more surprised if we told her that we had 
evidence that things strike us as being more similar because 
we have learned to put them in the same category, not the 
other way around. 
In the introduction, we discussed cases in which the 
structure of a domain is perceived as categorical  priori, the 
effect hat has come to be called categorical perception, with 
things being seen as more similar or different than one would 
have predicted on the basis of a purely physical measure of 
their properties (Harnad, 1987). Perhaps the most prominent 
example of a priori categorical perception is the rainbow. If 
changes in appearances were directly proportional tochanges 
in the wavelength of light, then we should see a smooth 
continuum of variation, like shades of gray, or of any other 
hue; we should not see colors themselves, as the qualita- 
tively distinct bands they appear to be. 
However, the physics of light alone is insufficient to tell us 
what colors ought o look like or even that the continuum of 
variation in wavelength ought to look like a continuum. In 
fact, there is nothing in the physics of light that dictates that 
the small portion of the spectrum from the invisible ultravio- 
let to the likewise invisible infrared range should look like 
anything at all. But it is in the nature of human perceptual 
systems to respond categorically to the visible spectrum of 
light, and colors look categorical from birth. Color names do 
follow from their appearances, not the other way around, 
just as Grandma would expect. 
There is a similar lesson from the other prominent 
example of categorical perception that we reviewed: pho- 
neme perception. As in the case of color, humans are born 
biologically prepared with "frets" along several speech- 
sound continua, sorting them into qualitatively distinct 
categories such as ba, da, and ga. Grandma's intuition--that 
people put things into the same categories when they appear 
similar--is again supported, and again the boundaries of 
these categories have been established by the "Blind 
Watchmaker" ather than by language, just as in the case of 
color. 
The examples of color and phonemic boundaries are 
striking, but the great majority of the categorical distinctions 
that people make are not so fully prepared in advance by 
evolution. Instead people need to learn them. The aim of our 
research as accordingly been to identify a mechanism that 
could explain how feedback from the consequences of one's 
categorizations actually results in categorical responding. 
Our results uggest that learning to categorize a set of items 
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produces a change in the multidimensional similarity space 
for those items, and it is this change that constitutes the 
learned categorical perception effect. Note that, logically, 
the relevant change could consist in either (a) shifting of 
item locations within a stable dimensional structure or (b) a 
change in the dimensional structure itself. The evidence 
from the MDS analysis of our last experiment suggests that 
it is the latter, not the former, that occurs, although adetailed 
understanding of the nature of these changes will require 
further study. In particular, we do not have comparable 
evidence for the artificial stimuli of Experiments 2 and 3, 
where there were only two dimensions of variation, both of 
which were carefully scaled. However, these experiments 
also showed within-category compression without between- 
category expansion, just as in the chicken cloaca study. 
The repeated pattern of compression effects without 
expansion effects in our studies occurred espite the differ- 
ences across experirnents. This is consistent with data from 
two other studies that can be interpreted as showing 
compression without expansion following category learn- 
ing. First, Shin and Nosofsky (1992), who were testing the 
goodness of fit of exemplar versus prototype versus com- 
bined models of category structure to data on the classifica- 
tion of dot patterns, measured similarity ratings for pairs of 
patterns, and also found what look like compression effects 
following category learning. Their data show compression 
for both within- and between-category pairs, but because 
there was more compression for within-category pairs than 
for between category pairs, the overall effect was the same 
as if there had been only compression within categories. 
Second, Homa et al. (1979) used MDS analyses to explore 
prototypicality effects produced by learning to categorize 
random dot patterns. We interpret heir results (see their 
Table 1, p. 18) as showing compression effects based on 
their MDS analysis of their data. However, they confronted 
the same dilemma we did in constructing their MDS 
analyses and also chose to submit he data from the before- 
and after-training conditions to separate analyses. Our 
analyses of the data from Experiment 4 suggest hat it is 
questionable whether one can extract evidence for compres- 
sion or expansion from MDS solutions alone when they are 
performed separately on pre- and posttraining data sets. 
Because there is no evidence of compression effects apart 
from the MDS data (unlike in our experiment, which 
provided independent evidence of compression from our 
similarity measures), the Homa et al. results should be 
interpreted with caution, because the dimensions themselves 
might be different for their learning and control groups. 
These results are partially at odds with those reported by 
Goldstone (1994a). He also observed the learned categorical 
perception effect, but in his studies it occurred primarily in 
the form of expansion effects. At present, he reason for this 
discrepancy is unclear. Goldstone's dependent measure was 
same--different judgments, not similarity ratings, and it is 
possible that the dependent measure may be a crucial factor, 
although why or how remains to be determined. For 
example, the same-different task requires the presentation f 
many "same" pairs, but the similarity rating task does not; 
in fact, none of the studies discussed above (our own; Homa 
et al., 1979; and Shin & Nosofsky, 1992) presented pairs of 
identical stimuli. Furthermore, the same--different task re- 
quires a binary response, whereas the rating scales require 
more graded responses (from 1 to 9 in our studies and in 
Shin & Nosofsky, and from 0 to 10 in Homa et al.). In 
addition to the difference in dependent measure, there are 
also differences in the stimuli themselves. For example, our 
stimuli (and, apparently, those of Shin & Nosofsky and 
Homa et al.) differ from one another along their various 
dimensions by amounts that seem to be well above the JND, 
whereas Goldstone's timuli were intentionally scaled to 
make adjacent pairs less than a JND (50% accuracy crite- 
rion) apart. The only way to really improve performance at
the boundary under these latter conditions is to enhance 
perceptual discriminability along the relevant dimension(s), 
an effect hat may be difficult to limit to that portion of the 
dimension that falls at the boundary. This interpretation is 
consistent with the "acquired istinctiveness" that occurs 
even within categories (though not to the same extent as 
between) for many of Goldstone's learning groups. It is 
interesting that the only cases of compression i Goldstone's 
studies occurred for dimensions that were not relevant o 
categorization. Those were the conditions under which it 
makes ense to neglect the differences among stimuli (i.e., to 
compress them). In our studies, where the differences 
between stimuli were readily identified, the categorization 
task did not present he perceptual discrimination problem 
encountered in Goldstone's paradigm, and the task could be 
most efficiently performed by, in Goldstone's (1994a) words, 
"learning to neglect differences along a categorization- 
relevant dimension" (p. 197; see also Kelley, 1984, for a 
theoretical prediction of a similar effect). Further esearch 
will be required to establish whether these kinds of differ- 
ences in stimuli and procedure reliably predict whether the 
categorical perception effect is one of compression, expan- 
sion, or both. 
Behavioral experiments such as ours and Goldstone's 
(1994a) only show that categorical perception can indeed be 
induced by learning alone. They cannot reveal what func- 
tional role, if any, compression-expansion might be playing 
in perceptual learning and representation. One possibility is 
suggested by simple feedforward networks like those stud- 
ied by Harnad et al. (1991, 1995) and discussed in the 
introduction to this article. In the net, the functional role of 
the categorical perception effect appears to be to move the 
stimulus representations i to positions where a plane can 
separate them into categories (linear separability) and mini- 
mize the confusability of items at the boundaries. Our 
MDS analyses of the data from Experiment 4 show that 
the process of category learning (see Figure 11) resulted 
in within-category compression sufficient to produce 
clear linear separability even without between-category 
expansion. 
Thus, both the human data and the network simulation 
data suggest that categorical perception effects may occur in 
the service of categorization. I  fact, one possibility is that 
they are the locus of a system's capacity to sort correctly. If
this were the case, then both nets and people manage to sort 
by manipulating interstimulus differences. At this point, this 
LEARNED CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION 751 
remains ahypothesis only, but one that is at least consistent 
with the data presented here. Note that the hypothesis n its 
strong form could be disconfirmed by finding a case in 
which people (or nets) manage to categorize but do not show 
learned categorical perception effects. Thus far, there are no 
definitive counterexamples, 3 and the available vidence does 
make one thing clear: The idea that it is obvious how to 
categorize on the basis of how things look is simplistic, at 
least when they vary in more than one respect. Categoriza- 
tion is a much more active process than Grandma suspected. 
Although these results go some way toward demonstrat- 
ing the importance of learned categorical perception effects 
for category learning, they raise a great many new questions 
in the process. The following explicit discussion of some of 
the most important of these is intended to indicate directions 
for further esearch. 
First, the reader will no doubt have noticed that Harnad et 
al.'s (1991, 1995) network simulations are capable of learning to 
categorize coded forms of one-dimensional stimuli that are 
difficult for human participants to categorize. As noted in our 
discussion of Experiment 1, if learned categorical perception 
actually alters the way things look, then it is likely to be resisted 
by the relative cognitive impenetrability of early perceptual 
processes. It should be pointed out, however, that the 
category training we gave our participants was relatively 
brief. Tasks that involve difficult perceptual discrimination 
are likely to require long-term training, with spaced rather 
than massed practice, before reliable categorization and 
warping of the similarity space can emerge. 
Furthermore, the network simulations are not intended to 
capture the entire human process of category learning, only 
to model certain functional components of it. In this respect, 
network models are not as different from symbolic AI 
models as is often claimed (Aizawa, 1992). For example, the 
simulations obviously do not have their own transducers and 
early perceptual processes. At this level, as we have already 
suggested, it may be hard-wired sensory processes that 
account for the fact that people fail to show the categorical 
perception effect for one-dimensional stimuli. This hypoth- 
esis could itself be explored by building more elaborate 
network models that incorporate more of the features of 
early sensory-perceptual systems, a strategy that should 
help to refine the understanding of where the learned 
categorical perception effect occurs in the human case. 
Second, there are questions about the relationship be- 
tween the learned categorical perception effect and many 
other well-documented phenomena in the concepts litera- 
ture. Changes in reaction time and in typicality ratings that 
occur during the course of category learning might both be 
explained by the pattern of changes in the relationships 
among items in psychological similarity space. For example, 
both compression and expansion effects should result in 
faster reaction times as category members become less 
confusable. These findings also raise interesting questions 
about he role of language in category learning. The idea that 
the lexicon and grammar of one's language determine or 
influence the structure of one's thought, including one's 
categories, is well known as the Whorf (1956) hypothesis; 
softened versions of the hypothesis have received some 
empirical support (e.g., Lucy, 1992). The bulk of the 
evidence seems more negative (e.g., Au, 1983; Berlin & 
Kay, 1969; Heider, 1972; Sloman et al., 1997; Pullum, 
1991), but the occurrence of learned categorical perception 
effects might be construed as support for a weak Whorf 
hypothesis. Unfortunately, the studies reported here do 
not compare cases in which category learning is mediated 
by words and those in which it is not. Our data do not, 
therefore, speak directly to the Whorl hypothesis, but 
questions about its relevance to category learning deserve 
further examination. 
Third, effects of category learning and naming need to be 
investigated during infancy and childhood when perceptual, 
cognitive, and linguistic hanges are particularly dramatic. 
We have begun pilot work in our labs to adapt our measures 
to studies with preschool children as a first step in exploring 
the pattern of learned categorical perception effects across 
ages. Similar questions could be asked about nonhuman 
species, where data on innate categorical perception exist 
(Ehret, 1987), and perceptual learning and categorization are 
being studied (Mackintosh, 1995; McLaren, Leevers, & 
Mackintosh, 1994), but learned categorical perception has 
yet to be investigated. 
Finally, electrophysiological measures are beginning to be 
used to study speech categorical perception (Maiste, Wiens, 
Hunt, Scherg, & Picton, 1995; Sharma, Kraus, McGee, 
Carrell, & Nichol, 1993) and even perceptual learning 
(Skrandies & Fable, 1994), but there are no data yet using 
these measures to study learned categorical perception. 
Current research in our laboratories i designed to investi- 
gate where and when in the processing of perceptual inputs 
the compression-expansion effects occur. Event related 
potentials (ERPs) measured before and after categorical 
perception-inducing category learning are compared with 
ERPs from people with equal exposure to the same stimuli 
without he feedback that produces learning. Analyses will 
attempt to identify features of the ERP that co-vary with the 
appearance ofcategorical perception effects. These data can 
then be used to guide later studies using more sophisticated 
mapping techniques to further efine the time-course and 
patterning of changes that occur during category learning. 
In conclusion, we hope that these experiments point the 
way to a new theoretical nd empirical strategy for under- 
standing mechanisms of category learning. Instead of descrip- 
tive modeling of conceptual structure, this paradigm raises 
new kinds of questions about the relationships among 
category learning, the structure of psychological similarity 
space, and the nature of concepts. They should certainly give 
Grandma something new to ponder. 
3 It is possible that he pattern of results reported by Sloman et ai. 
(1997) may reflect such a counterexample in that items that receive 
the same category label are not necessarily judged to be more 
similar than items not receiving the same label. However, because 
there is no prelearning baseline measure of similarities for these 
items, it cannot be known whether aprocess of compression does 
account for the observed categorization. Appropriate developmen- 
tal studies would be required to estabfish the character of the 
prelearning similarity spaces for such natural categories. 
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